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Williams v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 90 (Dec. 29, 2005)
1 
CRIMINAL LAW-JURY SELECTION 
Summary  
A jury, selected from the third venire, convicted Gary Jerome Williams of battery with use of a 
deadly weapon causing substantial bodily harm on Robin Swope.  On June 22, 2003, Williams and 
the victim (Robin Swope) engaged in an altercation after Swope saw Williams speaking to 
Swope’s thirteen-year-old daughter.  At trial, most details of the altercation were highly disputed 
including, who was the initial aggressor, who produced a knife, and whether Swope used highly 
inflammatory language.  
In 1985, when he was seventeen, the State of Arkansas convicted Williams of aggravated battery, 
sentencing him to fifteen years confinement.  The Nevada pre-sentencing report listed the Arkansas 
conviction as a juvenile offense.  Williams moved to exclude the conviction under NRS 50.095(4).
2
  
Without addressing whether his conviction at seventeen years of age was a juvenile or adult 
conviction, the district court denied Williams motion.    
During jury selection, Williams moved to dismiss the first venire
3
 because it included only one 
African-American.  The State did not object and the court granted the motion.  In chambers, the court 
contacted the jury commissioner twice to ensure that a second venire would be randomly selected.  
The court and counsel stated that the second venire contained “specific inclusion of African-
Americans,”
4
 accomplished by inserting the African-Americans available for jury duty that day into 
the jury panel from which the venire would be selected.  The State did not object to this method of 
selecting the venire.  The second venire included six African-Americans, of which three were 
included in the first twelve jurors.  The State then moved to dismiss the venire, stating that they did 
not feel it was randomly selected.  Specifically, the State objected to the number of African-
Americans included in the second venire, and requested a new venire. Williams objected and 
requested that the jury commissioner testify on the record as to the method used to select the second 
venire.  Without obtaining such testimony, the court granted the State’s motion and dismissed the 
second venire.  The third venire included three African-American members.  Neither party objected to 
the venire; one African-American served on the final jury.  
Williams appealed arguing that the court erred in permitting use of his juvenile conviction to 
impeach him and that the court erred in dismissing the second venire because specific inclusion is 
permissible to avoid discrimination and that the State’s motion to dismiss the second venire 
resulted in a Batson violation.
5 
 
1 
By Jacqueline A. Gilbert 
2 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 50.095 (2003) permits the use of prior conviction to impeach a witness 
unless certain exceptions apply. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 50.095(4) provides that “Evidence of juvenile adjudications is 
inadmissible under this section.” 
3 
The Court defined “venire” as “the group of persons sent to the district court 
from which a jury is chosen.  A ‘jury pool’ is the entire group of persons called for jury service that day.”  Williams 
v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 90, note 1 (Dec. 29, 2005). 
4 
Williams v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 90 
5 
Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that jurors cannot be excluded based on race).  
The Nevada Supreme Court first determined that Williams failed to show that the selection process 
for the first venire violated any constitutional rights. Therefore, without reaching the question of 
whether specific inclusion can be used once a constitutional violation has occurred in jury selection, 
the Court held that specific inclusion is not permissible if there is no constitutional violation.  
Additionally, because the district court made no record as to how the second venire was constituted, 
there was no evidence to support dismissing the second venire.  However, since the remedy for a 
non-randomly constituted venire is to grant a new venire, Williams had already received his remedy 
for the court errors in dismissing the first and second venires.  
 
The Court did, however, determine that a Batson violation occurred when the State requested the 
second venire be dismissed.  The Court relied on Miller-El v. Dretke
6
 in determining that challenging 
entire venires so as to obtain fewer African-Americans in the venire is discriminatory and implicates 
Batson. After performing the Batson analysis, the Court stated that because the State did not object to 
specific inclusion as lacking randomness during the chambers meeting, but only objected to the venire 
upon learning of its racial make-up, the State had not and could not offer any race-neutral explanation 
for wanting the second venire dismissed.  The Court reasoned that while the usual remedy to a Batson
violation is a new venire, in this case that remedy would not be sufficient. The third venire, granted 
by the district court, effectively allowed the State to discriminate against the target class.  Therefore 
the Court held that only a new trial would remedy the Batson violation.   
Lastly, the Court found that the issue of guilt was closely contested, and that the State furnished 
no evidence that Williams’ Arkansas conviction was not a juvenile conviction.  Therefore, the 
Court held that the district court error in admitting the conviction was not harmless and reversed 
and remanded for a new trial.  
Issues and Dispositions  
Issues  
 
1. Is specific inclusion of African-Americans in a jury venire permissible when there has been no 
finding of a constitutional violation in a previous venire?  
 2. Does Batson apply to dismissal of an entire venire?  
 
3. Does a conviction of a person less than eighteen years of age, carrying a sentence usually 
associated with an adult offense, provide evidence of an adult, rather than a juvenile, conviction 
for purposes of exclusion under NRS  50.095(4)?  
Dispositions  
1. No. Where no constitutional violation of the jury selection process has been proven, specific 
inclusion is not permissible.  
6
 545 U.S. ____, ____, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2332-33 (2005) (holding that a jury shuffle, affecting the make-up of an 
entire venire, if used to discriminate against African-Americans by placing at the end of the venire, implicates 
Batson concerns).  
  2. Yes. A Batson analysis is the appropriate means to determine if objection to an entire venire is 
discriminatory.  
 
3. No. Each conviction of a person below the majority must be evaluated individually to determine if 
that conviction was juvenile or adult for purposes of NRS 50.095(4).    
 
Commentary 
 Jury Selection  
State of the Law Before Williams 
Specific Inclusion  
The issue of specific inclusion is one of first impression.  The Nevada Supreme Court has held that 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution provide that a defendant is 
entitled to a jury venire selected from a fair cross section of the community.
7
 A three part test is used 
to determine if the fair-cross-section requirement has been violated: (1) that there is a distinctive 
community group; (2) that the group’s representation in the venire is neither fair nor reasonable 
compared to the representation in the community; and (3) that systematic exclusion in the jury-
selection process caused the under-representation.
8
The Fifth Circuit has accepted specific inclusion to 
remedy discrimination issues and constitutional violations;
9 
however, no jurisdiction has accepted 
specific inclusion without evidence of such violations.  While there have been allegations that the jury 
selection process in Clark County, Nevada does not provide a fair representation of the community’s 
population,
10
 the selection process
11
 has not been proven to systematically discriminate against 
African-Americans.   
Batson Violation  
The issue of whether Batson applies to challenges of jury venires, not just to individual jurors, is also 
an issue of first impression.  The Batson test requires that: (1) the defendant make a prima facie case 
for race discrimination in jury selection; (2) the State then provide a race-neutral reason for 
challenging jurors; and (3) the court determine if the defendant met the burden of establishing 
purposeful discrimination.
12
  The jury pool and venire selection process must not “systematically 
exclude distinctive groups” and therefore fail to reasonably represent the community.
13
  However, the 
seated jury need not mirror the community.
14
. A juror challenge will survive a Batson analysis so long 
as the State can demonstrate any race-neutral explanation that is absent discriminatory intent and the 
court finds the reason to be credible.
15 
 
7 
Evans v. State, 112 Nev. 1172, 1186, 926 P.2d 265, 274 (1996). 
8 
Id. at 1186, 926 P.2d at 275. 
9 
See 
e.g. Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966) 
10 
See Williams, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 90, note 14. 
11 
Nev. 
Rev. Stat. § 6.045 and Nev. Rev. Stat. § 6.090 provide the process by which juries are selected. 
12 
476 
U.S. at 96-98; Foster v. State, 121 Nev. ___, ___, 111 P.3d 1083, 1088. 
13 
Evans, 112 Nev. at 1186, 
926 P.2d at 274. 
14 
Id.  
15 
Kaczmarek v. State, 120 Nev. 314, 333; 91 P.3d 16, 29-30 (2004). 
Effect of Williams on Current Nevada Law 
Specific Inclusion  
Because the Nevada Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether specific inclusion would be an 
appropriate remedy for a Constitutional violation of jury selection,
16
 Nevada law will not change 
under Williams. However, the Court noted that the jury commissioner must be aware of the make-up 
of the community to ensure that the jury pool fairly represents the community.
17
  The Court also noted 
that comparative disparities of greater than 50% between the community representation of a race and 
representation of that race in a jury venire indicate that the representation may not be fair and 
reasonable.
18
  Without evidence that there has been history of systematic discrimination against any 
distinctive group, there is no constitutional violation based on the current jury pool and venire 
selection process.
19 
 
Batson Violation  
Williams establishes that a Batson applies not only to challenges of individual jurors, but to entire 
venires when the challenge is tainted by discriminatory intent.  Disliking the racial makeup of a 
venire will not be acceptable for challenging the venire.  The usual remedy where a Batson violation 
has occurred is dismissal of the venire and calling a new venire.  If this has been done by the trial 
court, then the defendant may have already received proper remedy and the error may be deemed 
moot on appeal.  However, in cases such as this, where the entire venire has been challenged for 
discriminatory reasons, the usual remedy would “condone purposeful discrimination by the State.”
20
  
Therefore, the only possible remedies for future Batson violations where the venire is challenged will 
be remands for new trials.   
Use of Juvenile Offense  
State of the Law Before Williams 
NRS 50.095(4) clearly states that “[e]vidence of juvenile adjudications is inadmissible” for the 
purpose of impeaching a witness.  Juvenile records may be used to demonstrate witness bias or 
prejudice.
21
  Juvenile records may also be used to impeach a witness if the defense voluntarily 
opened those files and the witness lied about the contents of the file.
22
 However, there is nothing in 
Nevada jurisprudence allowing for other exceptions.    
16
 Williams, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 90, note 19. 
17 
Id. at note 10. 
18 
Id. 
at note 9 (citing Evans, 112 Nev. at 1187, 926 P.2d at 275). 
19 
Williams, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 90. 
20 
Id.  
21 
Pickard v. State, 94 Nev. 681, 683, 585 P.2d 1342, 1343 (1978). 
22 
Cutler v. State, 93 Nev. 329, 333, 566 P.2d 809, 812 (1977).  
Effect of Williams on Current Nevada Law
 The Williams decision will not change Nevada law.  Juvenile adjudications cannot be used for 
impeachment purposes.  However, Williams does provide some guidance for using adjudications of 
persons under the age of eighteen for impeachment purposes.  The court must require evidence that a 
minor was adjudicated as an adult, and not as a juvenile, in order to admit the conviction.  
Conclusion  
In conclusion, challenges to entire jury venire are subject to a Batson analysis to determine if there is 
discriminatory intent to the challenges.  However, without proof that the jury pool and venire 
selection process are failing to provide fair representation of the community, lack of racial 
representation may not be a constitutional violation.
23
  Additionally, in order to avoid NRS 50,095(4) 
and use a crime committed while the witness was under the age of eighteen to impeach that witness, 
evidence must show that the specific adjudication was not as a juvenile.  
23
 A judicial committee is being formed to review jury selection procedures and determine “what steps should be 
taken to increase jury participation.”  The review is in response to suggestions that the jury pools in Clark County do 
not represent the diversity in the community.  Matt Pordum, Judicial committee to study jury pool diversity, Las 
Vegas Sun, Jan. 10, 2006, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/text/2006/jan/10/519942356.html. 
The Williams Court cited the Sun articles in its opinion. See Williams, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 90 at note 9.  
